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SHOULD WE WORRY ABOUT
THE BRAIN DRAIN?
1. Introduction
Last year’s EEAG report discussed how the
United States managed to increase its technologi-
cal lead over Europe in the 1990s, in particular
because of its greater production and use of new
information technologies.
If Europe wants to catch up, a number of things must
be achieved. One of them is retaining highly talented
workers. Yet, there are casual reports and anecdotes
suggesting that these workers are increasingly attract-
ed by the United States. Anecdotes of European
entrepreneurs having contributed to the growth of
the US economy with their talent and human capital
abound. One may mention Andreas Bechtolsheim,
co-founder of Sun microsystems, who was born in
Bavaria, as well as French-born Philippe Kahn,
founder of Borland. A recent report by the French
Senate shows that between 1995 and 1999 the number
of French nationals registered at the consulates of
Atlanta, Chicago, San Francisco, and London
increased by 53 percent,93 percent,44 percent,and 33
percent, respectively. Similarly, between 1990 and
1996, the number of French entrants with a visa,
granted because of their professional skills increased
by 60 percent. In an alarming tone, the report states
that as many as 12 percent of students who graduated
in 1998 from the French elite “grandes ecoles” – the
top schools for business and engineering – took jobs
abroad in the following year.
Emigration of highly skilled Europeans to the
United States is all the more paradoxical as the
U.S. is already better endowed with skills. If any-
thing, one would expect the returns to skills to be
higher in Europe,and skilled labour to move in the
other direction.
A reduction of intellectual capital in Europe may be
worrying for several reasons. In particular, intellec-
tual workers are complementary to other workers.A
greater scarcity of intellectual workers is likely to
push the wages of other workers down and to create
pressures toward greater inequality. Furthermore,
the expatriates’ secondary education, and often a
large share of their tertiary education, was paid by
the European taxpayer, who gets a lower return on
his investment in higher education.
This chapter discusses the economic significance of
this issue and analyses potential policy responses.
Our analysis suggests that the brain drain is a
symptom of a more general problem, namely insti-
tutional rigidities, that have a number of conse-
quences. In last year’s report we discussed how
these rigidities affected important determinants of
long-run productivity such as investment in high
technology or business start-ups.In this chapter we
essentially analyse one of the mechanisms by
which such rigidities – in particular wage setting
institutions, and the structure of taxation – act,
namely the expatriation of the most talented.
2. How big is the brain drain?
How worrisome is European emigration of highly
skilled workers? To answer that question one first
needs to evaluate the quantitative importance of the
phenomenon.This is not easy,but one can get an idea




H-1B visas issued by country of origin: 1990 – 1999
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
China (mainland) 610 1,145 894 1,031 1,256 1,887 2,330 3,214 3,883 5,779
India 2,697 4,102 5,552 7,606 11,301 15,528 19,203 31,686 40,247 55,047
Japan 3,791 5,167 2,767 2,152 2,217 2,070 2,411 2,929 2,878 3,339
Philippines 7,302 7,221 7,550 7,596 8,753 10,026 4,601 2,685 2,758 3,065
France 2,293 2,413 1,686 870 1,003 1,216 1,463 1,894 2,110 2,633
Germany 1,637 1,888 1,501 1,012 1,092 1,484 1,518 2,088 2,242 2,451
United Kingdom 7,174 8,794 6,726 3,993 4,230 4,771 5,601 6,928 6,343 6,665
Russia 3,709 3,942 1,651 1,892 1,245 1,196 1,255 1,357 1,395 1,619
Mexico 3,727 3,227 2,488 1,307 1,147 1,451 1,909 2,785 2,320 2,419
Australia 827 1,102 990 863 1,050 1,042 1,123 1,438 1,666 1,651
Subtotal 33,767 39,001 31,805 28,322 33,294 40,671 41,414 57,004 65,842 84,668
Ceiling 65,000 65,000 65,000 65,000 65,000 65,000 65,000 65,000 65,000 115,000
Source: US Department of State, Visa Office.EEAG Report 119
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evolution of H1-B visas granted by the United States
every year since 1990. These visas are explicitly tar-
geted at highly skilled workers.Many of them come to
work in the field of information technology.
The Table suggests that while emigration of highly
skilled workers has sharply increased in the second
part of the 1990s, moving from 1,216 to 2,633 visas
for the French, from 1,484 to 2,451 for the Ger-
mans, and from 4,771 to 6,665 for the British, this
phenomenon is largely cyclical, the mid 1990s
numbers marking a clear trough. However, there
are some reasons to believe that there is an upward
trend, although it is not very steep.
It is possible to get data on the stock of European
expatriates in the United States by using U.S.Census
data, which contain detailed information about an
individual’s place of birth – which is what we use as
a proxy for immigrant status1 – and characteristics.
We use this data set to get information on both the
number and characteristics of European migrants.
Unfortunately, it has not been possible for us to
use the results of the 2000 Census, as they are not
yet available. If the phenomenon has been acceler-
ating in recent years, as may be
inferred from Table 5.1, our
results may be biased.
These raw data seem to suggest
that the phenomenon is of lim-
ited importance. However, as we shall see below,
they understate its true economic consequences.
2.1 The characteristics of expatriates
Employment rates
A first aspect is that the employment rate is sub-
stantially higher for expatriates, as evidenced in
Table 5.3. It is slightly higher than the employment
rate of similar people among US residents and sub-
stantially higher (by 5 to 13 percentage points)
than that of residents in the home country. This is
not surprising: one most often migrates in order to
work in the host country. But it means that one
would under-estimate the impact of the brain drain
by just looking at the number of migrants.
This higher employment rate could simply result
from the fact that migrants are more likely to be in
more active age and gender categories.If,say,prime-
age males are more likely to migrate, then one
should expect systematically higher employment
rates for migrants; while Europeans who emigrate
would then be more likely to be employed, the same
would be true for non-Europeans immigrating to
Europe, and little could be deduced. In order to
check whether there is more to it,Table 5.4 disaggre-
gates by age categories. For males, it implies that the
Table 5.3
Employment rate of French-born, German-born,
and Italian-born US residents
US labour force FR GER IT
67.26 69 68.14 68.04
(60.6) (64.8) (55.7)
Note: Employment rate in the home country in parenthesis.
Source: 1990 US Census.
Table 5.2
Number of European-born










United Kingdom 548,000 0.92
Source: 1990 US Census.
Table 5.4
Employment rate by sex and age (population 25 – 64)
Age Sex US French-born German-born Italian-born
25 – 64 M 82.59 87.92 86.50 82.53
F 64.52 59.89 61.84 52.36
25 – 34 M 86.67 88.13 88.96 87.37
F 68.9 68.24 69.81 60.28
35 – 44 M 88.75 93.10 90.11 90.06
F 72.90 64.58 74.02 61.48
45 – 54 M 86.43 90.80 91.48 89.77
F 68.19 63.12 65.38 56.31
55 – 64 M 63.9 79.21 75.72 70.34
F 43.33 45.26 43.78 40.36
Source: 1990 US Census.
1 Using place of birth as a proxy for immi-
grant status does not go without caveats.
In particular, in the case of Germany,
which was occupied by US troops for a
long time after 1945, a substantial number
of individuals who claim to be born in
Germany are likely to be in fact of
American descent. For that reason we
shall also look at the characteristics of
those who have been in the United States
for less than 10 years.difference is not due to a mere composition effect,
but prevails across all categories. In particular, the
employment rate for older workers is 7 to 15 per-
centage points higher for European-born than for
the average US labour force, while in home coun-
tries it is much lower than in the US, due to early
retirement and similar schemes. For females, the
story is more mixed, probably because cultural dif-
ferences in participation rates, as well as family
motives for migration, tend to offset the effects of
selecting more active workers.
These data thus suggest that European expatriates
are disproportionately more active.
2.2. Education
The next question concerns the composition of
such migrants in terms of skill levels. If it were the
same as that of the home population,one could not
speak of a “brain drain”. Instead, one would see a
uniform outflow,which,while reducing the popula-
tion in the home country, has no effect on its rela-
tive skill composition.Then there would not be too
much reason for worrying,unless one considers the
mere size of the population as too low.
Table 5.5, which focuses on workers aged between
25 and 64 years, presents the proportion of people
who have achieved tertiary education and compares
it to that same number in their native country.2
Table 5.5 shows that European natives who live in
the United States are much more skilled than
those who live in Europe. This is true even in
countries that are traditional exporters of low-
skilled workers such as Italy and Spain. These
migrants are also more skilled than the US labour
force in which they participate.The tertiary educa-
tion rate in that population is 35 percent, above
that of European countries but much below that of
the expatriates.
One can learn more about the recent evolution of
the higher-education rate among expatriates by
breaking down these numbers by age categories,
which is done in Table 5.6. It suggests that the gap
between expatriates and natives is not a new phe-
nomenon, and does not seem to go away. In France
and Belgium, the “brain drain” seems to have sta-
bilised, in the sense that the last three cohorts of
expatriates have similar rates of tertiary education,
while achievements in the home country are
improving. In Germany, the brain drain seems to
be accelerating: recent cohorts of expatriates are
substantially more skilled than previous ones,
while there is no significant improvement in the
home country.A somewhat similar pattern is found
in the United Kingdom.In Spain,the quality of the
workforce is sharply increasing, but so it is for
expatriates. Finally, Italy has moved from being an
exporter of low-skilled labour to an exporter of




Tertiary education rate among expatriates 
and in home countries
Country US expatriates Home country






United Kingdom 62 27
Source: 1990 US Census.
2 The numbers for the home country come from the OECD for the
year 2000. Given that we use the US Census for the year 1990, if
educational achievement trends upwards, which is surely the case,
then this Table understates the difference between migrants’ and
stayers’ achievements.
Table 5.6
Tertiary education rates by country of birth 
and age category
Country United States,  Prop. home
%  country, %
Belgium: 25 – 34 68 34
35 – 44 86 28
45 – 54 67 23
55 – 64 49 15
France: 25 – 34 68 31
35 – 44 64 21
45 – 54 72 18
55 – 64 53 12
Germany: 25 – 34 59 22
35 – 44 56 26
45 – 54 48 24
55 – 64 41 20
Italy: 25 – 34 38 20
35 – 44 41 22
45 – 54 18 20
55 – 64 14 10
Spain: 25 – 34 64 33
35 – 44 44 29
45 – 54 32 19
55 – 64 35 9
United Kingdom: 25 – 34 66 25
35 – 44 68 26
45 – 54 56 24
55 – 64 43 19
Source: 1990 US Census.EEAG Report 121
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bours.3 Note, however, that the quality of expatri-
ates in recent cohorts remains lower than for other
European countries. This perhaps reflects the per-
sistence of low-skill immigration networks from
the south of Italy to the United States.
2.3 Is exceptional talent more likely to move away?
As Table 5.1 makes clear, expatriates typically rep-
resent 1 percent or less of their home population.
Even if their tertiary education rate is twice high-
er,this means that at most 2 percent of the college-
educated population is lost. This is likely to have
rather small economic consequences. On the other
hand, the issue can be much more serious if people
of exceptional talent or rare skills are very likely to
migrate.Such people may represent small numbers
but have a critical economic significance. In this
section, we tackle that issue from a variety of
angles.
The following Table looks at expatriates who have
a  doctoral degree and distinguishes between
recently arrived migrants (less than 10 years) and
others.Among recent expatriates, the doctoral rate
is quite high: from 3.6 percent among Italians to
9.1 percent among the French. This is two to four
times higher than among earlier immigrants, which
is partly a cohort effect but also suggests a possible
sharp increase in the quality of expatriates in the
second half of the 1980s.
Similarly, the next Table reports on the percentage
of expatriates with any post-graduate degree, that
is it includes workers who hold at least a master’s
degree.A similar phenomenon is found,although it
is less pronounced, for the United Kingdom.
So far, we have only studied the distribution of
measured educational levels among expatriates.
This misses a potentially important dimension of
skill, that is unmeasured ability. The loss of talent
would be underestimated if, at a given skill level,
those who emigrate from Europe have a higher
ability level than others. The problem can be most
acute for entrepreneurs, whose creative and man-
agerial skills are not necessarily well captured by
the educational system, where they sometimes fail
or drop out before completion of the course of
study (Bill Gates being one famous example).
One way to look at that issue is to estimate the
wages of expatriates compared to the average
wages of American residents with similar observ-
able characteristics.This technique says little about
how many outliers there are among expatriates as
compared to the home country, but it tells us how
frequent they are relative to the entire US labour
market.
This is what we have done, using the 1990 US
Census. According to these data, controlling for
individual characteristics, European-born workers
earn on average 9.4 percent more than their coun-
terparts. Thus, a “European premium” exists. This
suggests that the emigration process tends to select
people who fare better, given their personal char-
acteristics, than others, that is “exceptional peo-
ple”.
It is also possible to estimate different “European
premia” according to the individuals’ educational
level and country of origin.
Regarding education, the average premium to
being European-born tends to fall with the educa-
tional level, from 23 percent for those with no edu-
cation to just 3 percent for those with 17 years of
education. This probably means that the unob-
Table 5.7
Doctoral rates among expatriates, 
recent and earlier arrivals
Ph.D., recent Ph.D., 






United Kingdom 5.0 2.5
Source: 1990 US Census.
Table 5.8
Post-graduate rate among expatriates, 
recent and earlier arrivals
> Master’s, recent > Master’s






United Kingdom 14.3 10.2
Source: 1990 US Census.
3 This is confirmed by the findings of Becker et al.(2002),who,using
an Italian data base of expatriates, find that the Italian brain drain
accelerated in the 1990s and that about 5 percent of college gradu-
ates go abroad. However, their study is not directly comparable to
this chapter, as they look at Italian emigration to any country.served ability of low-education workers who
migrate to the United States is greater than that of
high-education ones.One possible interpretation is
that the United States disproportionately attracts
talented people whose talent was not identified by
the educational system in their home country.
With respect to the country of origin, one finds wide
disparities in the premia, as shown in Table 5.9.
These data tell us that, on average, European-born
people are more “talented” than similar US resi-
dents. One could further ask about the proportion
of “exceptionally talented” European-born people
compared to other participants in the US labour
market. Let us define “exceptional people” as
those whose earnings are unusually high compared
to others with the same observed characteristics.
This means those in a top percentile for “residual”
earnings, i.e. that part of earnings that is not
explained by observable characteristics. In the US
labour market, 1 percent of the people earn more
than 5 times more than people with similar charac-
teristics; 5 percent earn more than 2.43 times the
income of similar people,and 10 percent earn more
than 1.95 times the income of similar people. The
following Table shows the proportion of French-,
Italian-, and German-born participants who are
beyond these thresholds.
The results suggest, again, that there are wide vari-
ations across countries of origin.If one looks at the
“very top” people, that is the top 1 percent, one
finds that they are three times as numerous, in pro-
portion, among the French than on average. But
they do not seem to be significantly more present
among Italian and German expatriates. On the
other hand,“top people” (top 5 percent and top 10
percent), are substantially more frequent among
the French and Italian expatriates than on average,
and more so for Italian expatriates. They are only
marginally more frequent among German expatri-
ates. Interestingly, this pattern is in accordance
with business surveys.The Global Competitiveness
Report (World Economic Forum, 2002), a collec-
tion of competitiveness’ measures based on ques-
tions addressed to corporate executives, asks
entrepreneurs to answer on a scale between 1 and
7 whether they would agree that “The most talent-
ed workers remain in the country”. On that
account, the United States ranks first with a score
of 6.4, Germany is 4th with a score of 5.1, the
United Kingdom is 9th at 4.9, France is 18th at 4.6,
and Italy is 36th at 3.6.
Another way to measure the density of “excep-
tional talent” among expatriates is to look at the
distribution of income among them. Since such a
large proportion of them has tertiary education,
one would expect them to be more homogeneous
than US workers or non-expatriate European
employees. One would thus expect the distribution
of income among expatriates to be more equal.
This is, in fact, not the case. In 1990, the income
share of the top 10 percent in the French labour
market was 26 percent.The corresponding share in
the US labour market was 30 percent,while among
French expatriates in the United States it was even
higher, at 35 percent. Thus, even though the aver-
age French expatriate is much more educated, he
does much more poorly relative to the best 10 per-
cent of his peer group than the average non-expa-
triate or the average US worker.
Further evidence on workers with tertiary educa-
tion yields interesting additional insights. Thus, if
one limits oneself to workers with at least tertiary
education, the expatriate premium disappears:
controlling for individual characteristics, a
European-born who holds at least a master’s
degree does not earn more than the average US
resident. This somewhat confirms the above find-
ing that the premium falls with measured educa-
tion. Does that mean that outliers are more repre-
sented among expatriates with less than top educa-
tion, but not among expatriates with top educa-









Source: 1990 US Census.
Table 5.10
Percentage of European-born in top percentiles, 
adjusted for individual characteristics
Residual French, % Italian, % German, %
threshold
Top 10% 15.5 18.7 12.4
Top 5% 8 8.3 6.2
Very top 1% 3 1.2 1.2
Source: 1990 US Census.EEAG Report 123
Chapter 5
geneity with respect to the nature of the higher
education degree.
In the entire US labour market, relative to the
benchmark of a master’s degree, those who have a
doctorate earn on average 5 percent less,while those
who hold professional degrees (MD, LLD) earn 13
percent more. If one only looks at French expatri-
ates,however,PhDs earn 18 percent more,while pro-
fessionals earn 3 percent more. Among Germans,
PhDs earn the same, and professionals earn 8 per-
cent more, so that the structure of rewards to higher
education is similar to that in the United States.
Among Italian expatriates, PhDs. earn 10 percent
more, and professionals earn 3 percent less. These
differences suggest that the process of selecting the
most talented workers still operates for people with
a Ph.D. coming from France and Italy, while Italian
and French professionals earn less than similar US
workers,perhaps because they lack US-specific skills
regarding legal and medical practices.
In addition to wages and degrees, one can measure
top performers by occupation and achievement.
For example, it is useful to look at the proportion
of entrepreneurs among expatriates. According to
the US Census,that proportion is 9.1 percent in the
US labour market.Among expatriates, it is slightly
higher: 13.5 percent for Italian-born, 10.5 percent
for French-born,and 9.9 percent for German-born.
These figures are substantially higher than in the
labour markets of the home countries, where,
according to the Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor, cited in last year’s EEAG Report, the
proportion of entrepreneurs does not exceed 5 per-
cent. As for achievements, there are studies about
scientists,which tend to conclude that foreign-born
scientists perform better than average in the
United States. For example, Stephan and Levin
(1999), cited by the OECD (2002), find that the
foreign-born account for 18 percent of the most
cited patents, and for 25 percent of the founders of
start-up enterprises in the biotechnology sector. If
they were, on average, as productive as US born
scientists, they would account for just 11 percent of
patents and 14 percent of start-up founders.
To summarise, European expatriates have much
more human capital than the average employee in
both their home country and the United States.They
earn more than US workers with similar human cap-
ital, and, in the case of Italy and France at least, they
are more likely to be exceptional performers.
3. Economic consequences of the brain drain
The preceding analysis lends support to the view that
there is an outflow of high-skilled workers from
Europe to the United States, and that there are rea-
sons to believe that this phenomenon is accelerating.
This raises the questions of whether it poses a prob-
lem and what policy should do about it.
3.1 The optimistic views
While many observers express concern with regard
to the potential damaging consequences of the
brain drain for Europe, there are some arguments
according to which it is positive, or at least not
harmful.
One view is that Europe will benefit from it,
because most expatriates are only transitorily pre-
sent in the United States, and the home country
will benefit from their valuable experience upon
their return.The question is how important is such
return migration, quantitatively, relative to the
numbers of those who do not return or return only
for retirement.At present we lack evidence on this,
but casual evidence from the academic world sug-
gests one should be sceptical. This is confirmed by
some surveys. For example, a 1999 French study
concluded that out of 1,000 young graduates estab-
lished abroad, some 31 percent had no intent of
returning. 80 percent of them say that their career
prospects are better abroad. Furthermore, it is
known by specialists of immigration that many
people who intend to return actually stay abroad.
This finding is confirmed by other studies. The US
National Science Foundation has studied the trajec-
tories of foreign-born PhDs in Science and
Engineering (Johnson and Regets, 1998). It found
that 63 percent of graduating students intend to
remain in the United States.The proportion is high-
est for Asians (65.5 percent), and greater than one
half for Europeans (55.9 percent). The same study
finds that out of those who graduated in 1990–91, 59
percent of the British and 35 percent of the Germans
were working in the United States in 1995.
Interestingly, there is no sign of larger return migra-
tion in the longer term; the proportion of foreign-
born scientists working in the United States 25 years
after their Ph.D. is the same as those working in
there five years after their Ph.D. This suggests that
part of the return migration is temporary – people infact go back to the United States after a while – and
therefore should not be overstated.
Overall, these studies suggest that, on average,
some 50 percent of Europeans who do doctoral
studies in the United States can be expected to be
lost to Europe. On the other hand, there is evi-
dence that those who do return earn a higher
income beyond what would be predicted by their
observed characteristics, which suggests that inter-
national mobility is associated with the acquisition
of specific additional skills.4 In the case of Ireland,
for example, the premium to return migration for
males is estimated at 10 percent.5
Another view holds that greater migration of
skilled workers is the by-product of globalisation,
and that while it is true that Europe loses more of
these workers than in the past,it also imports more
of them than it used to.According to that view, the
brain drain is just the outcome of greater labour
mobility worldwide,and not of a systematic pattern
of greater incentives for highly skilled workers to
migrate to the United States.6 There is certainly
some truth in that view, since internationalisation
implies greater mobility of executives. But in the
field of science and engineering, it is clear that the
flow from Europe to the United States is orders of
magnitude higher than the reverse flow.7
This being said, there are a number of mechanisms
that should convince Europe’s policy-makers to be
worried about a possible delocalisation of its elite.
3.2 Lower returns to investment in public 
education
First, there is a fiscal externality in education.
Many European countries have a generous educa-
tion system, and taxpayers invest a substantial
amount of money in training the elites. Presum-
ably, the social return to such investment is in the
form of greater innovation, better managing prac-
tices and so on, when these people take on impor-
tant jobs. However, when they go abroad and stay
there, this return is reduced, and taxpayers are
actually subsidising the human capital and produc-
tivity growth of the United States. The greater the
brain drain, the lower the return to European pub-
lic investment in higher education; this may in turn
lead to a reduction in that investment, for example
via a lower political support from the bulk of tax-
payers, which will also penalise those highly skilled
workers who would have stayed in Europe.8
3.3 Inadequate specialisation
Second, the brain drain could affect specialisation of
economic activity in Europe in an undesirable way.
Basically, this means that very highly skilled workers
will be in rather short supply relative to some other
developed countries and that Europe would spe-
cialise away from sectors that are intensive in that
factor. In last year’s EEAG Report, we presented
data showing that Europe is less involved in
advanced technologies, tends to specialise in medi-
um-tech goods, and is lagging the United States in
terms of high-tech patents or in the intellectual bal-
ance of payments.The brain drain is one contributor
to that pattern.In principle,this specialisation should
not have harmful effects per se. One can perfectly
achieve similar living standards and grow at the same
rate, as the United States, while being specialised in
cars, tourism, shoes, food, and so on. There are rea-
sons to believe, however, that specialisation is not
entirely neutral.One such reason is that different sec-
tors have a different growth potential, essentially
because they have different learning curves – the
learning curve refers to the fact that costs fall, that is
productivity goes up, as the cumulated output of a
good increases, because people gradually learn how
to improve practices. There is probably more scope
for productivity improvements via learning in high
technologies that in medium technologies. For exam-
ple, costs in the semiconductor industry have been
constantly falling at a very rapid pace.This technolo-
gy,in which the United States and East Asia are lead-
ers, was an important factor of growth.
3.4 Reduced rents from innovation
Another potentially important effect of the brain
drain derives from the fact that if the most talent-
ed scientists and entrepreneurs go to the United
EEAG Report 124
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4 This may be due to selection bias, though, if return migration is
triggered by having found an attractive job in the home country.
5 See OECD (2002).
6 This would be the case, for example, if a reduction in the home
bias in consumers’ preferences induces an increase in the demand
for imports, which would then increase the market shares of multi-
nationals, and eventually the expatriation rate among their top sci-
entists and executives.
7 See Mahroum (1999).
8 Of course, it may well be that from the point of view of global
social welfare, it is efficient to subsidise education in Europe even
though those who benefit from it are best employed in the United
States; at a minimum, however, one should then consider compen-
satory transfers in favour of European taxpayers so as to give them
a fair share in the global social benefits of the higher education
they have funded.EEAG Report 125
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States, then the United States will own more
patents. This might be of little consequence, and a
nice landscape,folkloric traditions,or know-how in
cooking and handicrafts may be as much an asset
to an economy as patents in computers, biotech-
nology, and aerospace. Yet, patents give monopoly
rents to the firms that own them, and – provided
one has to pay the high monopoly price for a given
good as a consumer regardless of location – it is
preferable for workers to be located where these
monopoly rents are. This means higher wages and
more job security, because a part of excess profits
is transferred to workers via bargaining mecha-
nisms, and monopolies are less vulnerable to
volatility than firms exposed to competition. In
other words, we know that the labour market con-
sists of “good jobs” and “bad jobs”9, that the for-
mer entirely dominate the latter from the point of
view of wages, working conditions, fringe benefits,
and the like,and that good jobs are located in some
industries and not in others. In particular, indus-
tries that earn high monopoly rents (due to patents
or other factors) typically offer more good jobs.
Furthermore, economic analysis has also shown
that from the point of view of social welfare it is
likely that there are too few “good jobs”. Lagging
behind in intellectual property rights will therefore
probably reduce the proportion of good jobs in the
economy, all else being equal. European govern-
ments have tried to increase the number of “good
jobs” by labour market regulations, and this has
been successful if one defines a “good job” as a
long lasting job. But this strategy has generated
unemployment and reduced productivity, and may
thus prove unsustainable in the long run.
3.5 Negative effects on entrepreneurship and 
business creation
The argument is magnified if one believes that
entrepreneurs are particularly affected by the
brain drain phenomenon. Entrepreneurs are a cen-
tral ingredient of capitalism. Their activity is ulti-
mately responsible for job creation, innovation,
and growth.Absent entrepreneurs,economic activ-
ity is a mere potentiality. They are the ones who
take the practical steps in order for gains from
trade to be exploited,by bringing together comple-
mentary factors of production,making supply meet
demand, and so on.
One may think of the economy being in one of two
regimes. In one regime, entrepreneurs are not a
limiting factor, and competition selects among
them on the basis of luck and efficiency.The econ-
omy is “fully employed” in that factors are not idle.
In the other regime, entrepreneurs are a limiting
factor. Savings have a low return and people are
underemployed. An excess outflow of entrepre-
neurs may harm the economy if it moves it from
one regime to the other, although the effects could
be small if it does not.
There are reasons to believe that the recent accel-
eration of the brain drain has been associated with
a slowing down in business starts. In the French
case, for example, the monthly number of new
business establishments peaked at 27,000 in the
late 1980s, during a strong expansion. Quite
remarkably,a steady increase in business starts was
experienced between 1993 and 1995, when it
peaked at 26,000 despite a depressed economy.
However, since then, it has never exceeded 23,000,
although the French economy experienced an
expansion even stronger than that of the late
1980s.10 Of course,this may be due to other factors,
for example the evolution of the regulatory envi-
ronment, itself a potential cause of entrepreneurial
emigration.But at least these numbers are compat-
ible with the view that the drain of entrepreneurs
dampens the rate of business formation.
Furthermore, business formation in high-tech
areas may be further harmed by the expatriation of
top scientists. The evidence discussed above sug-
gests that exceptionally able workers are over-rep-
resented among European expatriates. The impact
of such individuals on economic activity could be
much larger than suggested by their wages if they
exert positive spillovers on business formation in
high-tech industries. Can that hypothesis be sub-
stantiated with empirical evidence? Zucker et al.
(1998) study the determinants of birth rates for
biotechnology enterprises. In particular, they look
at the impact of intellectual capital in a given area
on the birth rate in that same area.A key finding is
that controlling for measures of overall intellectu-
al capital, the number of “star scientists” (as mea-
sured by publications and citations) has a strong
positive impact on business formation. In other
words, losing the “stars” may look quantitatively
unimportant if one measures the loss by the actual
9 See Bulow and Summers (1986) and Saint-Paul (1996) for a theo-
retical analysis. 10 See: www.insee.fr.number of people going abroad multiplied by their
wage (as an estimate of their productivity); it
seems, however, that these people have a critical
impact on high-tech business formation and thus
on the long-term growth potential of an economy.
3.6 Pressures towards greater inequality
The lower the number of high-skilled workers, the
more unequal will be the distribution of income.
High-skilled workers are typically thought of as
complementary in production to low-skilled work-
ers. Consequently, a reduction in the supply of
high-skilled workers reduces the wages of low-
skilled workers, while it increases the wages of
high-skilled workers. Thus, if one could reduce the
outflow of high-skilled workers while not touching
existing systems of wage setting and redistribution,
there would be a gain in terms of a more equal dis-
tribution of income. However, as we discuss below,
we believe that one important factor fuelling the
brain drain is rigid wages and income redistribu-
tion, and that this will have to be reconsidered if
one is serious about reversing the brain drain. In
other words, if income redistribution is the only
concern, a certain level of brain drain is the price
to be paid. But redistribution is less effective, the
greater the mobility of skilled labour. Consequent-
ly, a more intensive brain drain may lead society to
reconsider its redistributive policies, as it means
that such policies are more costly.
4. Causes of the Brain Drain
In order to devise appropriate
policies to deal with excess emi-
gration of talented workers, it is
necessary to have some idea of
its causes. This is the subject of
this section.
4.1 Greater income for 
high-skilled workers in the
United States
As we have shown above, the
brain drain is an outflow of
human capital from countries,
which have a lower human cap-
ital endowment than the desti-
nation country. If production
technologies were the same
across Europe and the United
States, and if wages were set competitively, then,
since skills are scarcer in Europe, the return to
skills would be higher in Europe than in the United
States. Highly educated workers would therefore
have no incentive to move from Europe to the
United States. Rather, the reverse would occur.
A first reason that comes to mind to explain the
brain drain is that technologies may be more pro-
ductive in the United States, implying that, at any
skill level, wages are higher overall. This effect
does not seem to be very strong, however. Most of
the difference between Europe and the United
States in terms of GDP per capita is due to a lower
employment rate in Europe. The productivity dif-
ference does not exceed 15–20 percent, and it is
unlikely that people would move just to earn
15 percent more, at least on an hourly basis.
Furthermore, mobility would then not be biased in
favour of highly skilled workers, although the lat-
ter may be at an advantage in obtaining visas.
Another reason is that, despite the fact that skills
are scarcer, the wage structure is more compressed
in Europe than in the United States, implying that
the return to skills is actually lower on this side of
the Atlantic. Figure 5.1 reports the average returns
to an extra year of education (in percent) in select-
ed countries, from Psacharopoulos and Patrinos
(2002).It shows the proportional impact on pre-tax




11 This is the appropriate number one wants to look at if one is
interested in the incentives to migrate rather than the incentives to
acquire education, for which the cost of acquiring education must
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and confirms that the returns to education are on
average lower in Europe. Note, however, that
France has the same returns as the United States.
Again, a few percentage points of extra returns to
schooling does not justify emigration, but this phe-
nomenon has to be added to that of higher US pro-
ductivity.
A third phenomenon, which cumulates with the
other two, is the fact that top marginal income tax
rates are also typically higher in Europe than in the
United States, with the notable exception of the
United Kingdom.
Top marginal income tax rates are 55 percent in
France and 51 percent in Germany,respectively,vs.
some 40 percent in the United States and the
United Kingdom. If one adds social security con-
tributions, the difference between the total cost to
the employer and the workers’ income implies
nearly confiscatory average tax rates for top earn-
ers in Europe. Figure 5.2 shows the fraction of the
total cost to the employer accruing to the worker,
after all taxes and contributions for a yearly nomi-
nal employee income of 200,000 euros.12
The figures speak for themselves: If an employer
wants to give $1 more to say a top executive, it will
cost him $3 in France vs.$1.70 in the United States.
If anything, these differences in the distribution of
income have been aggravated by recent trends.
While in the United States
income inequality has risen
over the last three decades as a
result of technical change, in
Europe it has remained much
more stable.This is in great part
due to labour market institu-
tions, which compress the dis-
tribution of wages. Greater mo-
bility of high-skilled workers
makes it difficult to sustain
such institutions if wage in-
equality continues to increase
in the United States.
Admittedly, Europe offers bet-
ter amenities in terms of public
goods, social services, and the
like. But the amenities are more adequate for lower
and middle class workers than for top workers.These
can presumably buy high quality health and educa-
tion in the United States, and have little demand for
their publicly provided equivalents in Europe.
4.2 An environment more friendly to 
entrepreneurship
The motivation for moving may not only be mone-
tary. People may also enjoy the greater economic
freedom, less restrictive social norms, and even in
some cases the greater freedom of expression in
the United States compared to Europe. Regarding
the ease of starting a new business, for example,
Harvard’s  Global  Competitiveness Report con-
structs a start-up index capturing the ease with
which one can start a business. The United States
ranks first at 2.02, followed by Hong Kong at 1.63.
The United Kingdom ranks 6th at 1.36, Germany
21st at 0.41, and France 35th at – 0.18, ahead of
Portugal but behind Mauritius.
One may speculate that part of the wage premium
associated with being an expatriate, especially at
low and moderate education levels, reflects the
greater density of people with entrepreneurial and
creative skills among migrants. At this stage, how-
ever, we lack direct evidence.
4.3 Agglomeration externalities and economic
geography 
Most of the preceding explanations are associated
with the view that the institutional environment is
friendlier to talented people in the United States.
Figure 5.2
12 Wedge includes the employee’s income taxes and social security
contributions, and the employer’s social security contributions.If this view is correct, then institutional change is
part of the solution if one wants to reverse the phe-
nomenon. However, another potential explanation
does not involve institutions, but is based on the
view that, for historical reasons, high-tech sectors
are located in the United States.To the extent that
there are favourable scale and spill over effects
associated with the location of a large number of
high-tech industries in the same place, the reward
to talent will be higher in these locations, and they
will therefore attract more talented people. This
view may be relevant to the extent that markets for
highly talented people are thin, implying that it
may be quite difficult or impossible to find an
appropriate job in some areas. A Cameroonian
specialised in artificial intelligence, for example,
will virtually be unable to find adequate employ-
ment in Cameroon; and even if Cameroon’s insti-
tutions were quite favourable to high technologies,
it would be unlikely that a sizeable labour market
for AI specialists would arise there.The problem is
less severe when one is dealing with migration
from Europe to the United States, but may still
exist. For example, there is hardly a place in
Europe where one could find a market for com-
puter specialists comparable to Silicon Valley.
If this explanation is correct, institutional change
will not go a long way toward reversing the brain
drain.More active “industrial policy” may be need-
ed, as is discussed below.
5. Possible solutions?
Above we posed the fundamental question: should
governments worry about the brain drain problem
and if so, what are the appropriate policies? The
answer to that question depends obviously on
which causes and which consequences of the brain
drain are most relevant. Here we discuss a certain
number of measures that would alleviate the brain
drain problem; most of these measures, however,
tackle the more fundamental problems of lack of
incentives for risk-taking and innovation, of which
the brain drain is just one symptom.
Concerning the fiscal externality, for example, it
seems reasonable to consider public funding of
higher education as a loan to the individual rather
than a gift. This loan could be repaid in money or
in kind, by working in the country, which has
financed the education, or in the European Union.
Such a measure is unlikely to have a large impact
on the brain drain, but at least it would offset its
negative consequences on the social returns of
public investment in higher education.
In our view, reversal or at least reduction of the out-
flow of talent necessitates two key measures. First, a
reconsideration of taxation of top incomes, which in
some countries is nearly confiscatory, if one adds all
the taxes. One has to do away with the view that a
reduction in marginal income taxes at the top is
“unfair”. Reducing the income of the rich is not a
goal in itself.The goal of redistribution should be to
increase the income of the poor. Standard models of
optimal income taxation for a society, which cares
about inequality, predict that marginal income taxes
should be falling as income rises. The reason is that
one wants to give the most talented workers greater
incentives to work, since their working time is most
valuable to society. The tax losses induced by such
changes are likely to be rather small, as top earners
account for a minute share of total tax receipts.
Furthermore, a reversal of the brain drain tends to
compress the distribution of wages as highly skilled
workers are less scarce, thus partly offsetting the
adverse impact on inequality of reduced taxation at
the top. Finally, talented workers exert a number of
favourable effects on the rest of society that are not
reflected in tax receipts.
Second, a reduction of barriers to entrepreneurship
seems to play a key role in discouraging talented peo-
ple from staying in the home country. These barriers
mostly penalise potential entrepreneurs from a social-
ly disadvantaged background, and those who, despite
great performance, have underachieved at school
(perhaps because of illness or family problems in
addition to poverty). As we have seen, European
expatriates tend to be above-average performers, not
only overall,but at all education levels,and especially
at low educational levels.This could be related to the
fact that the fraction of entrepreneurs among expatri-
ates is slightly higher than in the US labour market,
that is much higher than in the source countries.There
is no reason why regulation could not be adjusted so
as to induce more of these people to start a business
in Europe.This would not only retain a greater share
of precious talent, but also enhance social mobility
and the returns to effort in our societies.
In our view,these measures are necessary.But they
need not be sufficient. Within countries, regula-
tions and taxes are fairly uniform, and yet we
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observe that talent is concentrated in some areas,
usually around political decision centres, universi-
ties, and advanced technology firms. The location
of these centres reflects political and economic
events of the past.Similarly,in a global world,most
intellectual talent may end up being located in the
United States, just as it deserted rural and provin-
cial areas to go to political centres and big cities
one hundred years ago. This situation may be a
self-sustaining equilibrium, and it can take much
more than mere convergence to US regulatory and
taxation standards to reverse it. This raises the
question whether voluntary government invest-
ment in “centres of excellence” would work. That
is, governments could act as a co-ordination device
to implement some new “Silicon Valleys” in
Europe. This is the old industrial policy which is
now somewhat discredited, as decades of support
for “technological champions” from both the EU
and national governments have not prevented
Europe from gradually sliding behind the United
States.These policies could work in principle, how-
ever, provided the talented people on whom they
rest have incentives to stay, that is provided the
other changes have been made.
The real difficulty, though, lies in subsidising “tal-
ent” without targeting the wrong sectors at the
same time.There are many examples of state inter-
vention in Europe directed at a specific technology
which ended up being a failure, for example
because it was not adopted as a standard. Thus,
restoring industrial policy with a high-tech orienta-
tion is not so easy as it looks. Rather than taking
the risks of directing the nature and contents of
economic activity, governments can do it in a less
committed way13, invest more in higher education
and public research, with an emphasis on better
rewarding performance in these sectors. They can
then hope that these institutions will have positive
effects, at the local level, on high technology firms.
Similarly, favouring the mobility of highly skilled
workers within Europe may favour the emergence
of clusters of talent and put a brake on the brain
drain. Increased mobility of scientists could help a
lot in light of the fact that the market for these
workers is thin.That is, a given individual does not
have a large number of alternative job opportuni-
ties, which increases the value of establishing one-
self in a more efficient labour market, such as the
United States. Better integration of the labour
markets for scientists and top engineers across
Europe will go a long way in reducing its thinness.
In principle, the single market grants mobility as a
right. In practice, however, many obstacles remain.
In particular, lack of portability of pension
schemes remains a major obstacle, especially
because pension rights are not proportional to
total cumulated contributions. Removing these
obstacles would probably help,but the “talent clus-
ters” that would emerge need not be uniformly dis-
tributed across countries; there would be winners
and losers, and some countries might even lose
more of their talent to other member states than
they have been losing to the United States. (An
example of such a phenomenon is French emigra-
tion to London.) 
Respectively, one may believe that enlargement of
the European Union will have some effect on
migration flows of highly skilled workers.
Presently there is a large flow of professionals and
scientists from Eastern Europe to North America.
The integration of these countries will probably
divert part of that flow to Western Europe.
Admittedly, the total outflow may be even larger,
which is unlikely to help Eastern European coun-
tries. On the other hand, this diversion phenome-
non may increase the intellectual capital of
Western Europe,which may favour the emergence
of high technology clusters.After a while, Eastern
European countries could eventually benefit, for
example if there exists some intra-EU scheme
helping the repatriation of Eastern European sci-
entists. This will not happen, obviously, until the
Eastern European countries have reached a cer-
tain level of prosperity and stability.
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